tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5737853305204847838.post6509157734371449528..comments2023-11-20T05:27:02.037+00:00Comments on GrogNews: The View From the Ground in AfghanistanBranthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07482746543829626805noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5737853305204847838.post-37772906224988764152011-09-28T20:21:46.112+01:002011-09-28T20:21:46.112+01:00It's still a good basic axiom that insurgencie...It's still a good basic axiom that insurgencies need a sanctuary, or at least a fairly secure rear area, to work from if they are to have any chance of success. Even better if it's protected by an international border the government has to respect. The Afghan insurgency, at least in the south, has this.<br /><br />The differences are that Laos did not possess nuclear weapons and a large standing army that probably would act to protect its sovereignty, nor did it have to contend with fundamentalist wackos, nor did it have a special interest in either becoming a dominant regional power or, failing that, keeping the entire region unstable.<br /><br />Aside from that, yes, perfectly good analogy! (snicker)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5737853305204847838.post-20024646554460088812011-09-28T18:03:15.008+01:002011-09-28T18:03:15.008+01:00I am starting to believe more and more that the ke...I am starting to believe more and more that the key comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam is not one of homefront political will. Instead, the key lesson is that if your enemy is not going to respect political boundaries (Laos / Pakistan) then you shouldn't either. If the nation on the other side of the "border" is unable / unwilling (again, Laos / Pakistan, respectively) to control it, let them know that you'll be doing it for them and they can get over it.Branthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07482746543829626805noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5737853305204847838.post-28420087190866089562011-09-28T17:51:54.725+01:002011-09-28T17:51:54.725+01:00"A small team of Dari- and Pashto- speaking A..."A small team of Dari- and Pashto- speaking Americans" - I think he must have had most of the available supply of such people with him. <br /><br />This reminds me of the "tribal strategy" another Special Forces officer, Major Jim Gant, got some media and think-tank mileage with, a year or two ago. What happened with that? At least he was not under the illusion that some kind of central and effective governance (you probably won't get either, and you certainly won't get both) will come to Afghanistan.<br /><br />Major Lujan and his team helped to clear a few districts in the South. Life there is returning to what passes for normal, for now, because yes the Taliban have been pushed out to - where? Well, somewhere else, but they'll be back. <br /><br />All of ISAF is about 130,000 people right now, most of whom are not combat troops anyway, and this is as good as it's gotten. The Afghan National Army is not much larger right now, and while it's supposed to get up to 260,000 in a few years, twice the size of ISAF (though it will be gone by then), I would not look to see it get much better. <br /><br />There are exceptional men in any army, but they are not always enough to turn the tide. Ask the ARVN, though I'm loth to draw comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com