Liveblogging Connections, Day II, Take 2

We're broken up into working groups addressing the USAF FLTC wargame and looking at a reunified-Korea-getting-picked-on-by-the-Chinese-in-2030 scenario. Our group is focused on a deterrence mission, and trying to identify the necessary technologies that would support that COA in 2030. We're trying to let the Koreans defend themselves and not give the Chinese a target to shoot at. So far the Russians are staying out of it. We want to keep them out.

We've been directed to develop a branch plan in case the Chinese do come South. Our base plan involves a lot of deterrence and situational awareness. Our branch involves a Chinese-fomented insurgency in the former NK among the ethnic Chinese and remnants of the former NK regime.

What new technologies are we looking at?
"Canyon Observer" - a small UAV that carried IED, CBRNE, atmospherics, adversary support sensors.
"Canyon Warrior" - a small UAV that works in urban canyons for targeting and strikes.
Cyber-based offensive weapons
"Spectrum Dominator" - deny enemy use of RF spectrum, including air defense and cyber ops.

As we develop the branch plan, though, it's clear we're not going to fire the first shots. So unless the we're told the Chinese are coming south at 100mph with guns blazing, we're going to find some way to not get dragged into a shooting war.

Jon just wants to blow shit up with nukes, though.

- stand by for break in coverage as we prep to brief the different groups -

Group 1
Classic military-driven "move out and draw fire" COA.
Assumed escalation to shooting war and opened ROE for full on engagements, to include shooting at Chinese SAMs across the border, and putting us homeland defenses on alert.
The part that bothered me was the commitment of 2 ground brigades. If they're there as a tripwire to die in place and justify escalation, there's too many; if they're there to defend Korea, there's too few. No real purpose for them to be there. That's dangerous.

Group 2
COL Walters briefing - Don't want a war, but allow/encourage ROK declaration of 'war' on insurgent forces in their nation.
US to fulfill treaty obligations, but won't sacrifice preponderance of PACOM forces for a lost mission to Korea.
Next briefer:
Why sacrifice a few BNs of Marines when ROKs have a *really* big army?
Made assumptions of ROE/SOPs.
Assets to Guam, Japan, etc rather than Korea. "Once they're in Korea, they're hors d'oeuvres"
Counterstrikes/replacements ready for any offensive Chinese action.

Group 3
Our group - 2LT briefing a room in which he's easily the youngest by 10 years.
As noted above - lots of deterrence and S/A assets.
Q: is blockade of China realistic/practical?
A: our intent was not to blockade, but to inconvenience on the nat'l level - raise price of oil, depress market for exports, damage time-to-market for perishable/time-sensitive goods.

By: Brant