The window of opportunity seems to be closing. Israel seems especially worried that a successful in - bomb - out venture could be carried out if the installations were well-protected.
I find it hard to imagine a situation where 3 or 4 don't happen though (or are threatened).
Ahh, but it's a tricky issue, Brant. Quite apart from the lack of clarity as to Iranian intentions (I'm not even sure the Iranians are clear on their own intentions), it is also unclear how much damage a preemptive strike could do, whether we know where everything is hidden, and whether a strike would substantially delay the Iranian program, deter them from restarting... or encourage them to speed it up (in the knowledge that if they did have nukes, no one would be bombing them).
Keep in mind that we're not necessarily advocating any course of action over another, or even saying these are the most likely. We're throwing out a variety of options and letting everyone sound off on their ideas or suggestions.
Rex - I had in mind that any strike on Iran would *follow* either of the actions by the Iranians. Either of the attacks (US or Israeli) would follow one of the Iranian actions (testing a nuke or starting a nuke plant).
Iran starting up a nuclear power plant is, by itself, not a good justification for either US or Israeli action. Waiting until they run a test might be too late. Considering failures on WMD intelligence in recent memory (i.e., Iraq), I think the trigger point has to be a blatant breach of or withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or an *iron-clad* corroborated consensus throughout the intelligence community and credible international partners (like the UK, but not Israel, who has an incentive to push into war with Iran) that the Iranians are making (or possibly importing) highly-enriched uranium or plutonium.
Once that happens, the first Gulf War and its immediate aftermath are actually a good model:
1) We politely but firmly ask Israel to sit this out, lest their involvement enrage our so-called Arab "allies" in the region.
2) Execute a 2- to 4-week intensive air, naval, and special operations campaign to destroy as much of Iran's WMD and missile assets and capabilities as possible, along with their Air Force, Navy, and Revolutionary Guard. We have to go after the Air Force and Navy to limit their ability to lash out against our oil interests in the Persian Gulf.
3) If we can take out the mullahs, Ahmadinejad, and their cronies, that's good, but not essential.
4) "Sit on"/"contain" Iran via no-fly zones, *enforced* trade embargoes, etc. for several years. This is expensive, but nowhere near as expensive as trying to actually invade them or force regime change.
5) Be prepared to absorb some terrorist attacks, or at least attempts, because that will be the only real option left for Iranians to strike back. Preempt these attacks as much as possible and retaliate *hard* for every terrorist attack that we can trace back to the Iranians.
6) Once the sting of our initial attack has passed and the populace are back to being more angry at their "leaders" than they are at us, begin semi-covert support of Iranian resistance elements (including the democracy movement) to drive regime change from within.
7) Be prepared to cut our losses. Don't allow Vietnam-style escalation/mission creep to happen, especially during step (6). If worse comes to worse, gradually relax the containment measures but be prepared to repeat step 2 if they act up again.
My two-cents worth as an armchair strategist...
The one thing that worries me are the basing issues for aircraft. I think we can count on the Gulf states to give us basing rights for this campaign, since a nuclear-armed Iran scares them. I'm not so sure we can count on Iraq or Turkey on the western flank or any of the 'stans (including Afghanistan) on the eastern flank. Long-endurance armed UAVs would help.
The window of opportunity seems to be closing. Israel seems especially worried that a successful in - bomb - out venture could be carried out if the installations were well-protected.
ReplyDeleteI find it hard to imagine a situation where 3 or 4 don't happen though (or are threatened).
Ahh, but it's a tricky issue, Brant. Quite apart from the lack of clarity as to Iranian intentions (I'm not even sure the Iranians are clear on their own intentions), it is also unclear how much damage a preemptive strike could do, whether we know where everything is hidden, and whether a strike would substantially delay the Iranian program, deter them from restarting... or encourage them to speed it up (in the knowledge that if they did have nukes, no one would be bombing them).
ReplyDeleteKeep in mind that we're not necessarily advocating any course of action over another, or even saying these are the most likely. We're throwing out a variety of options and letting everyone sound off on their ideas or suggestions.
ReplyDeleteRex - I had in mind that any strike on Iran would *follow* either of the actions by the Iranians. Either of the attacks (US or Israeli) would follow one of the Iranian actions (testing a nuke or starting a nuke plant).
Iran starting up a nuclear power plant is, by itself, not a good justification for either US or Israeli action. Waiting until they run a test might be too late. Considering failures on WMD intelligence in recent memory (i.e., Iraq), I think the trigger point has to be a blatant breach of or withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or an *iron-clad* corroborated consensus throughout the intelligence community and credible international partners (like the UK, but not Israel, who has an incentive to push into war with Iran) that the Iranians are making (or possibly importing) highly-enriched uranium or plutonium.
ReplyDeleteOnce that happens, the first Gulf War and its immediate aftermath are actually a good model:
1) We politely but firmly ask Israel to sit this out, lest their involvement enrage our so-called Arab "allies" in the region.
2) Execute a 2- to 4-week intensive air, naval, and special operations campaign to destroy as much of Iran's WMD and missile assets and capabilities as possible, along with their Air Force, Navy, and Revolutionary Guard. We have to go after the Air Force and Navy to limit their ability to lash out against our oil interests in the Persian Gulf.
3) If we can take out the mullahs, Ahmadinejad, and their cronies, that's good, but not essential.
4) "Sit on"/"contain" Iran via no-fly zones, *enforced* trade embargoes, etc. for several years. This is expensive, but nowhere near as expensive as trying to actually invade them or force regime change.
5) Be prepared to absorb some terrorist attacks, or at least attempts, because that will be the only real option left for Iranians to strike back. Preempt these attacks as much as possible and retaliate *hard* for every terrorist attack that we can trace back to the Iranians.
6) Once the sting of our initial attack has passed and the populace are back to being more angry at their "leaders" than they are at us, begin semi-covert support of Iranian resistance elements (including the democracy movement) to drive regime change from within.
7) Be prepared to cut our losses. Don't allow Vietnam-style escalation/mission creep to happen, especially during step (6). If worse comes to worse, gradually relax the containment measures but be prepared to repeat step 2 if they act up again.
My two-cents worth as an armchair strategist...
The one thing that worries me are the basing issues for aircraft. I think we can count on the Gulf states to give us basing rights for this campaign, since a nuclear-armed Iran scares them. I'm not so sure we can count on Iraq or Turkey on the western flank or any of the 'stans (including Afghanistan) on the eastern flank. Long-endurance armed UAVs would help.
-- Guardian
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteGood thoughts Guardian... it's nice to see someone put a little thought into a COA analysis :)
ReplyDelete