It seems counterintuitive to suggest that the U.S. could produce a smaller force while increasing its fighting strength. Yet for the reasons outlined in this article that is precisely what we argue. In order to facilitate the most effective and efficient Department of Defense, we contend it is beneficial to first revise the National Military Strategy. This revision will more effectively support the president’s overall National Security Strategy. Reorienting the DoD into a set of forces that are actually joint in execution will strengthen the American military and thus enhance overall national security.
In support of the president’s four strategic objectives, we recommend a complimentary four-point military strategy:
· defend the American homeland, vital national interests, and friendly nations;
· maintain open access to the global lines of communication in the domains of air, land, sea, space and cyber;
· prevent any state, or combinations of states (or nonstate actors) from dominating by force of arms the European-Asian land mass or allied nations;
· support peaceful relations between nations and foster greater understanding among international militaries
By: Brant
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2 comments:
I've read both books and neither seemed to provide any great ideas. It's basically about a brigade-based army with a heavy U.S.-slant (plenty helicopters), no answer to the problem of infantry shortages for difficult terrains (mountains, woodland, urban) and a strange approach to support organisation contrary to the American tradition of ad hoc organisations.
The claim that the proposals save money and provide much more power appears unsubstantiated to me.
To me, the big change that I noticed was in the training ramp-ups. Rather than try to keep the 82d on permanent alert, you'd rotate battle groups through the CTCs and then they's spend the next 6-12 months as the nation's "read to deploy" force, with a mix of units ready to go.
The other thing that was a big deal (at the time) in Breaking the Phalanx was the idea of doing away with the div-level HQs for the artillery, engineers, and DISCOM, and putting those battalions directly under the maneuver brigades. Everyone (read "lots of generals") flipped their shit at the loss of potential command billets (especially if you were FA, QM, or EN). 5 years later, what did we do with the BCT organization? Put the support battalions directly under their battlefield BDE HQs.
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