Liveblogging Connections, II

Second Session
Innovations in Military Wargaming

BRUCE GUDMUNDSON

Historical background of wargaming - why did it take root in Germany, but not in Russia, France, etc?
One of the main reasons is the background/education of the military in each.
Scharnhorst / Clausewitz raised in Prussian tradition in which learning is presented as a series of problems.
Scharnhorst teaches tactics using a large scenario of 'problems' around the defense of Berlin.

von Moltke (the elder) starts a wargame club in the 1820s. von Verdy du Vernois recommends replacing the dice with a human umpire. Moves adjudication to BOGSAT.

How does the "case method" work - based around a story. Role-play in roles within the game, appeals to the inner child/inner play.
Story leads to a problem. Problem to crisis to solution.

Gudmundson trying to build on/ implement case studies. Trying to make wargaming more relevant to military training and widen the audience by showing applicability to everyone in the organization instead of just enthusiasts.
Trying to draw a distinction between experiential learning and phenomenology. "Gimme the answer..."
Instead of "here's the problem, what's your plan?"
"But I don't have enough information."
"Guess what? You never do. What's your plan?"
"But I'm just a lieutenant. This is above my pay grade."
"HQ just got wiped out. You're in charge. What's your plan?"
Make them tell the story.

Comment from Dave Ross: Instead of an "AAR" make the participants write a story to follow-up. Lends to narrative nature of scenario.
Another audience comment: tabletop wargamins is designed to tell the story, but stays away from BOGSAT.
Different audience member: wargames are analytical tools but too often the wargame is looked on as an endpoint with a defined outcome instead of a learning tool to advance the conversation


CAPT JEFF CARES
Discussion of board gaming with Naval Operational Art

Admiralship is not generalship. Not even a word that's equivalent.
At the Naval War College trying to update operational art from beyond the last round of deep think back in 1972.

Current perspective is a dominant seapower persepective. Seapower is commercial + naval power.
Naval power is machine power, but very tribalized and beholden to the acquisition cycles.
"Two decades of naval dominance have dulled our appreciation of war at sea."
Decades ago ships would face off against each other in wargames with much fleet pride on the line.
No longer the case.
Joint doctrine is very focused on classifications, very Army-centric. Not very descriptive of effects and ideas.

Field grade officers should be able to take operational art, but frequently side-tracked by joint assignments / operations.

Boardgaming in Portsmouth resurging as Paul Vebber and others were creating a new board game.
Intentionally designed as a board game to force face-to-face interaction and discussions.
Abstract the tactical fight - intentionally fuzzy to force operational art - and focus on a higher echelon. How do you advise the admiral on operations with the fleet?
FoW / friction:
- FoW is how much to do you know?
- Friction is how easily you can change operations already underay.
Missions specify which groups of units should do things, not how to do them? Send a force to do a task, rather than tell them how to do things.

Blue vs Gold - no specific real-world scenario. Geography isn't even real. Littorals, sea lanes, deep-water, etc.
NOT a force-projection game onto the dirt.
Double-blind w/ 3-day turns to allow time to ponder.
Intended to make people think how employ the fleet across the water.

Not a simulation. Get players thinking about achieving operational objectives and not the "right" answers.

Designed as a game-in-a-tube to get it out to the fleet as easy as possible.

Question from audience: Will there be bolt-ons for other services (ie airpower) to factor into the game?
Answer: No. Right now it needs to be a Navy game for Navy reasons. It's intentionally simple to get navy guys started fast and fill a gap in navy knowledge.


DAVE ROSS
AFRL in Rome, NY

Talk about wargaming and counter-insurgency.
"I feel strange talking about counter-insurgency with the Marines, in particular, since they've been doing it forever."

How does USAF factor into COIN?
Asked to address the educational issue - getting USAF officers thinking about how they extend their expertise into this.

Objectives include "easily learned, fast-playing" which isn't necessarily achievable, but still strived for.
A lot of research based on previous studies, readings on insurgencies and terrorism; interviews with insurgency and stabilization operators.
30+ books, 40+ games, etc all examined.

Triumvirate to examine of friendlies - enemies - criminals, with population in the middle tugged between them.
A lot of factors being flipped by on slides way to fast for me to read, much less capture the notes of them.

Influence mapboard based on hexagonal tracking chart of varying factors, with oppressed regime on one end, and representative gov't on the other. Host nation factors impede movement.

How do PMESII factors influence each faction
How do PMESII factors influence each other
No silver bullets
Costs (in blood & treasure)
Outside actors can affect outcomes based on personal goals (UN, NATO, religions, other nations, etc)

Game is a battle for control of factions and how to manipulate them.
- ID them
- ID motivations
- Apply PMESII assets to influence
- Apply assets to weaken/strengthen other factions

Factions in game include USMC, USAF, insurgent groups, host nations, etc.
More stable factions are more effective.

Running through slides of game components, like cards, maps, etc.

Intel is an important function within the game. Costs of cards to use (intel cards, oops cards, ops cards, etc)


Q&A

How to get the culture of the military back into wargaming?
Anti-intellectual culture within the military?
Too much money in the digital/'sims' world? Fantastic wargame hall at NPS in Monterey, but no way anyone's going to use $13 million facility for a tabletop game with cardboard counters.
Wargaming can't be used in a vacuum. Must be used in conjunction with other tools.
Must demonstrate utility, but have to find a way to move away from wargame being the "answer machine".

Wargames being characterized as 'experiments' to current officers and defined, repeatable outcomes, with precision, are expected, even though it's counter-factual and not realistic.

How do we balance operational wargaming (part of MDMP), experimental/modeling wargaming, and training wargames? How to differentiate when they share the same name?
Do we need to do a better job of evangelizing?


BREAK TIME - LUNCH
I'm part of the first panel after lunch, so I'm not going to be able to blog it. We'll be back this afternoon...


By: Brant