However, the character of the likeliest future joint “warfights” has fundamentally changed since the advent of “jointness.” And, now with the benefit of nine years of persistent conflict, future conflicts will most certainly be fought to achieve more circumspect ends as well. Finite resources and a new appreciation by defense strategists for the real — not theoretical — costs of regime change indicate that joint warfighting is entering a new era. There will be more constraints on the military’s human and material resources. By implication, there are also likely to be significant limitations on the military courses of action available to U.S. decisionmakers.
Ultimately, Secretary Gates’ full spectrum “balance” will be created between service components and not within each of them. In this regard, it is quite likely that the U.S. is nearing a revolution in force sizing, shaping, and missioning. Quasi-specialization is inevitable. Over time, two new distinct service component groups — land forces and SOF in one and air and naval forces in the other — will optimize for different “high-intensity” contingency demands and not quixotically tilt at the windmill of complete “full-spectrum” capability as the Army now portrays itself in its own doctrine
h/t SWJ
By: Brant
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