Liveblogging Connections, III

After a very lively discussion of contracting and wargame development (not the topic of the actual panel, BTW), I'm back to cover the next batch of folks...
And Pete B wanted me to mention he got no applause on our panel, probably as a direct result of his tangent on cultural implications and social acceptability of COAs based on immersion in civilian gameplay.


Fourth Session
Methods of Future Warfare Adjudication

Roger Mason - Afghanistan Reconstruction "Wargame"

How it was developed, built, adjudicated... Missed the first part while re-situating my laptop from our talks.
"Organizations At War in Afghanistan and Beyond" by Abdulkader H. Sinno mentioned as a key systems analysis of the game

Players operate at the level of national participants (US, Afghan, Pakistan, etc)
3 provinces (scaled for manageability) with PRTs and local gov't , as well as tribes, insurgents, etc

2 playtests already, including officers with CENTCOM deployment experience, and NGO experience
Plan on a playtest here at Connections in after-hours sessions

Sorry this was so short. I was getting myself re-parked after the session I was on.


Joe Miranda - Combat Results Through The Years

Combat Odds:
19th Century you needed 2:1 odds to ensure success (how do we know? Clausewitz says so...)
WWII you needed 3:1 odds
AirLand Battle you only needed 1.5:1
But now, combat odds are also overcome by sensors: if you can ID target first, and shoot, then combat odds are irrelevant.
Get away from combat odds and focus on effects-based outcomes

21st century warfare effects:
- Lawfare
- Cyberwar
- Standoff distances
- Insurgency

- Cascading effects (second- & third-order effects) based on media, communication, etc


Crisis XXI game to model future COIN
DARPA project from years ago
Start with a "matrix" map
2 axes: legal--criminal ; violent--peaceful
How do you move a group along the axes?

Integrating military doctrinal terminology in wargaming
trying to minimize wargame jargon, so no 'language barrier'
Crossover between civilian and military

Millennium Wars 2.0
Capability-based ops where most operations are non-kinetic
Units have no combat factors
Capabilities beget missions and multiple units/missions aggregate into operations, which beget effects
Units have properties that interface with "the universe" through their properties

Properties of units are also influenced by who controls them, and national characteristics.
Israeli C4I: 4
Syrian C4I: 2
Eqyptian C4I: 2
Palestinian C4I: 1
So Israelis act 2x for each Syrian/Egyptian unit and 4x for each Palestinian

Interaction table instead of CRT, based on effects curve w/ number of successes.
Number of 'intel successes' determines what you're follow-on actions can be


(Jon Compton setting up)


Jon Compton - Connections, Fallacies, and Potential Directions

Lies, damned lies, and statistics: "Statistics are like bikinis. What they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital." - Aaron Levenstein
"All models are wrong, but some are useful" is only half of the truth. "All models are wrong, unless we're trying to convince someone to give us money." - the Gospel According to Jon

Institutional bias can color the way we look at things. Were the pyramids really large blocks that were dragged a long way, or were those blocks cast-in-place concrete?
Similarly, are class sizes really the determining factor in academic success? What happens when you control for wealth?

Next slides are around Sean Gourley and power laws... Read earlier post on this here.

"Nothing is more dangerous than an energetic fool." - Shimon Naveh

Asking the right questions is more important that having the right answers.
How do we build models and systems for predictive accuracy?
When I flip a coin, at what point does it become 'heads' or 'tails'? Classical determinism tells us it was at the Big Bang.

Theories are constructed out of governing sets of assumptions. Individual/institutional/cultural biases...
Whatever gets published is always the "best possible regression" because that's what we can get paid for.

Chess is essentially a very large game of tic-tac-toe, but the permutations are so vast we can't follow them. Otherwise every chess game would end in a tie.


Photos of different terrorists...
Showed photos of Bin Laden, followed by Charles Manson. Jon asked "What's the difference between this guy and the previous guy."
My answer of "We know where Manson is" got a round of laughter and applause.
With the rest of the photos: Baader-Meinhoff, other terror leaders, Jon was cataloging identity entrepreneurs.
The point is that there's always a single person leading the charge for whatever group.
The leaders have a commitment to violence that over-rides whatever other stated aims they have, and recruit followers in search of social affiliation and identification.

Factors of insurgencies are not common with organized crime, insurgency, militias, or civil wars.
Aggregation of factors breed inaccuracy of macro-level analyses.
Non-state violent actors are defined by their acts, not their intentions.

The guy who caught the Red Army Faction did so by figuring out how someone could survive "underground" - cash payments for everything, including rent; not locally registered, etc. Based on thee factors as processes of elimination he was able to find them.


ow do we crack the nut of the identity entrepreneur?
Look at ourselves, and catalog our vulnerabilities. Catalog, don't assess.
Environmental adjudication - "Second life with guns".
(Brant's aside: how close is this to DARPA's RealWorld?)
Catalog successes by looking for people who completely go off the rails in virtual worlds as a precursor to them going nuts in the real world. Find the troublemakers and hire them before they become disaffected troublemakers with real guns.


- moving into Q&A -
Q: So are all identity entrepreneurs only committed to violence?
A: Identity entrepreneurs typically reacting to some injustice, but attracts a core of followers who are committed to violence, next ring of followers are there for social interaction.

Q: Is Millennium Wars C4I mechanism based on OODA loop? Is that underlying assumption?
A: Yes, it seeks to model the differences between sides in a way other than factors on the counters.
(Peter's muttering... "too bad it's not actually accurate...")
How does different leadership within the same nationality affect performance of units? (ie, really good commander)
No echelon noted on front of counter until you get close enough to see it
My reaction: not realistic at all! I can't tell if it's a half-strength battalion or a reinforced battalion from a distance, but I can tell if it's a platoon or a division from quite a ways away.

Q: Afghanistan reconstruction game: how easy is it to find win-win compromises, rather than zero-sum games.
A: Rambling around how PRTs might could team up, or positive/negative card effects, but no real answer to how we can all 'win'.

- wrapping up with final statements -

I'll try to take pictures of open play later tonight and share them between here / CSW.

By: Brant