Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC

Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC
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First things first - I got here late. Why? Because the event was moved, to a location with -zero- parking, which meant humping it across campus, through a construction zone that detours pedestrians while disorienting them, and to a building whose "main entrance" faces the back wall of another building instead of facing the street. I missed the first 15 minutes; I'm hot & sweaty; and I've got no live web connections (or even a power jack), so this is all getting uploaded at once instead of as I go. No, I'm not happy.

Apparently I didn't miss any speakers, just the intro remarks

Professor James Gow - King's College, London

talking about the changes in conflicts over the world in the last 30-60 years, and speaking very much from a script instead of talking as he goes.

Contested legitimacy among the combatants - who is the "correct" or "moral" combatant, whether based on ethnicity, religion, politics, etc

Contemporary armed conflict is complex in that it is a "war among the people" - either hiding among the friendly or sowing fear in the unfriendly
Civilians are widely targeted and a full partner in the conflict rather than just 'in the way'

Technological changes have greatly increased precision and therefore lowered the tolerance for imprecise strikes
'De-humanization' of war, in which "western" personnel are half a world a way and not vulnerable to counterattacks at all; technological buffer that cognitively separates the warrior from the war

(shuffling of papers as he lost part of the script - not a "talk" but a "speech" with very closely narrated guidelines)

Force - Will - Passion
19th century was focused on force; 21st century is focused on will and the battle for the hearts & minds of the personnel

Switches to PPT with the juxtaposition of Normandy vs a child soldier in Africa

"Victory" has been replaced by "success"

Is now talking about a "Trinity 3(+)" but going through slides too fast to get a look at it

• (Multiple) Global audiences - political leaders - armed forces - people
  
• Partners & Allies
  
• Opponents
  
• Bystanders
  
• Transnational communities

Professor Hew Strachan, Oxford College - (oldest chair of military history in the world)

No PPT, just much shouting, as though the broadcast mike on the podium was broken, and we were trying to talk back to the original site of the talk back at Hyde Hall.
Talking about the follow-up to a Reagan speech in the '80s that announced the SDI
After the talk, Strom asked whether the nuclear deterrent was the correct paradigm, and asked the audience to imagine a possibility of the world without a Cold War
The MoD reps scoffed and encouraged the moderator to move on and discuss things that were actually realistic

Pre-1990: focus on stability
Since 1990: focused on the novelty and the new - what can it do for us, what's cool, what's cutting edge, and what's the latest and greatest.
Capable of producing strategic forecasts and long-term predictions, but very poor strategy
Our analyses are rather poor, and we call them "strategy" to sound like we know what we're talking about, but we openly acknowledge that we have no idea what we're talking about.

Four areas of continuity
1. US / NATO / Allies need to maintain status quo path; quite a challenge for NATO, and esp US. Hard for US to see itself as a liberalizing/democratizing influence while simultaneously maintaining hegemonic power (conservative viewpoint)
How do you manage change, given that you know it will occur?

2. The drivers of war - failed states, rogue states, non-state actors - all work from the basic reference of "the state" and build off of the state institutions as their primary building block.
state-based solutions are the norm, and conflicts like water, or ethnicities, occur along borders where there is artificial constraint

3. Despite this, conventional war between states has been consistent in frequency since 1945.
Civil wars receding after initial post-colonial flare-ups, as good governance has proliferated
Inter-state war is still common, but b/c it's not of the level of WWI / WWII / Cold War, we don't treat it as "major" war (Falklands, Gulf I)

4. Contemporary war is "change-back"
By emphasizing 'novelty' - non-state actors, states w/o internal monopolies on force, commercial-focused warlords - we miss that these are not novel and lack the ability to cognitively analyze them in the right frame.
Two distinctions
- "Nature" and "Character" of War: The essence of war is its reciprocity; once you take out force, everything changes ; character of each war is different even though the nature is consistent.
Character of war changes not just from war-to-war, but within the war as it goes on (example of Gulf II from 'liberation' to COIN)
- Strategy in Theory & Strategy in Practice of War:
Strategy in Theory pre-Clausewitz discussed only contemporary; post-Clausewitz was more historical and looked backwards for parallels to current action; during Cold War strategic theory became atrophied b/c of lack of direct experience with nukes - current strategy theory is bad
Strategy in Practice is very focused on tools and not outcomes (technology over population); but war is not significantly different over the years (principles of war) - discussion of French general whose quote highlights this


During the 1990s, the western powers waged war at a distance for utilitarian purposes (ie Kosovo)
Post-9/11, pre-emptive war was accepted ahead of pre-emption
Now, war is seen as discretionary and a choice, rather than necessary

But there cannot be a coherent strategy without a coherent viewpoint of how war is viewed
Totally different focus on the war if it is one of survival than one of choice (my note: explains our huge gulf in appreciation of how Israel views war)

Don't understand difference between policy and strategy
Policy can become subordinated to war if we're not careful
Policy and strategy should be contentious and they cannot be subordinated to each other permanently, but always in conflict

When political leadership is divided or is not engaged, then military leadership expands to fill the vacuum. Current strategy in the US is seen coming from Petraeus and McChrystal rather than the political leaders
US strategy should be discussed at NSC level, and other countries interested in mimicking that structure, but NSC is not seen as a strategic leader in the US


GEN Mattis, USMC, Commander JFCOM:

Nature of war will change when the nature of water changes.

Have to separate politics from uniforms, esp among the officer corps or the trust btw civ-mil breaks down.

Need a strategic re-awakening of officer corps so that strategy & policy are coupled and clarified. Officer corps ceded strategy to po,iticians in 1950s with rise of nukes.
Hannibal was very tactically proficient but had no strategy.


My battery is running low - no power outlets, either! - what a crap way to run a conference... ass-clowns... I'll have to sign off at some point here. I hope to get a seat with a power outlet tomorrow (back in the original building) for the early sessions...

Links for all conference articles:
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC, Day 2 morning sessions
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC, Day 2 morning session 2


By: Brant