Anniversary: Battle of Tora Bora

Today marks the start of the Battle of Tora Bora.

On December 3, a group of 20 U.S. commandos was inserted by helicopter to support the operation. On December 5, Afghan militia wrested control of the low ground below the mountain caves from al-Qaeda fighters and set up tank positions to blast enemy forces. The al-Qaeda fighters withdrew with mortars, rocket launchers, and assault rifles to higher fortified positions and dug in for the battle

What lessons should we have learned from this battle? How well are we applying them today? Sound off below!

By: Brant

Monday Video: Jammin' in the 'Stan

Some Brits getting their groove on in Afghanistan By: Brant

Anniversary: Battle of Tora Bora

Today marks the start of the Battle of Tora Bora.

On December 3, a group of 20 U.S. commandos was inserted by helicopter to support the operation. On December 5, Afghan militia wrested control of the low ground below the mountain caves from al-Qaeda fighters and set up tank positions to blast enemy forces. The al-Qaeda fighters withdrew with mortars, rocket launchers, and assault rifles to higher fortified positions and dug in for the battle

What's the closest historical example you think of to the Battle of Tora Bora? You thoughts below in the comments!

By: Brant

DOD IDs Units for Upcoming Afghanistan Rotation

The DoD has identified the next units for headed out for the upcoming Afghanistan rotation.

The Department of Defense today identified four major units to deploy as part of the upcoming rotation of forces operating in Afghanistan.  The scheduled rotation involves one cavalry regiment with roughly 3,000 personnel; one armored brigade combat team (ABCT) with roughly 3,200 personnel; one infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) with roughly 2,200 personnel; and a division headquarters with roughly 450 personnel to rotate in summer 2013. The deploying units include:

Brigade Combat Teams:          

2nd Cavalry Regiment, Vilseck, Germany.

2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Knox, Ky.


Division Headquarters:

4th Infantry Division Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colo.


DoD will continue to announce major deployments as they are approved.

By: Brant

Current ISAF Placemat

Here are the current numbers, as of February 2013. Yes, I'm a slacker for not checking more frequently to have posted this earlier.
click to enlarge



troop numbers by country - 2 Malaysians (did they get lost?) and 3 Icelandianers (didn't know they had a military!) among them



Nice to see the Georgians sending a large battalion to Afghanistan and into the impossible mission that is Helmand.



By: Brant

DoD Identifies Next Units for Upcoming Afghanistan Rotation

The DoD has identified the next units for rotating to Afghanistan

The Department of Defense today identified three major units to deploy as part of the upcoming rotation of forces operating in Afghanistan. The scheduled rotation involves one Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with roughly 2,250 personnel; a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) with roughly 2,200 personnel; and a corps headquarters with roughly 500 personnel to rotate in spring 2013. The deploying units include:

Brigade Combat Teams:
4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.
10th Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.

Corps Headquarters:
III Corps Headquarters, Fort Hood, Texas.

By: Brant

Anniversary: Battle of Tora Bora

Today marks the start of the Battle of Tora Bora.

On December 3, a group of 20 U.S. commandos was inserted by helicopter to support the operation. On December 5, Afghan militia wrested control of the low ground below the mountain caves from al-Qaeda fighters and set up tank positions to blast enemy forces. The al-Qaeda fighters withdrew with mortars, rocket launchers, and assault rifles to higher fortified positions and dug in for the battle

Were you there? Know anyone who was? Share your stories below.

By: Brant

Video: Firefight on Hero-Cam

Here's a firefight as captured by the machine-gunners helmet-cam By: Brant

Statement by Secretary Panetta on NATO Intervention

The DoD released this Statement by Secretary Panetta on NATO Intervention from Brussels, Belgium

Eleven years ago this week, on Oct. 7, 2001, our forces began a long fight against Al Qaeda. They also embarked on a mission to help the people of Afghanistan defend their country and determine their destiny. Every nation represented at this table has sacrificed for that cause over the past decade. We in the United States have lost 2,000 of our precious sons and daughters, nations of this coalition have lost hundreds, and the Afghans have lost thousands. We must pledge that our fallen shall not have died in vain. Rather, with our shared goal so close at hand, we must realize the noble purpose to which they dedicated their last full measure. That will take patience, courage, and commitment…in the face of a resilient enemy…and in the face of those who may try to criticize or divide us.

The fact is that we have made significant progress in Afghanistan. Last month, U.S. and ISAF forces concluded the surge of forces to the fight. For the United States, sending an additional 33,000 men and women to war was no easy decision. But it was the right one. It was the courageous one. And it has made a decisive difference.
As a result, the Taliban could not regain lost ground in 2011 and lost still more in 2012. Compared to a year ago, more Afghans are secure, and conflict is farther away from population centers. Coalition casualties have decreased by 30 percent from last year, a trend that emerged months before we fully recovered surge forces. At the same time, the number of Afghan security forces has grown to about 350,000, and that larger force has maintained recruitment and retention. Those forces have taken the lead for complex operations and they are suffering far more casualties than coalition forces -- a further sign of Afghans’ willingness to sacrifice for their own future. Fighting together, ISAF and Afghan forces have delivered serious blows to the enemy and have brought about a turning point in the campaign.

When conditions supported recovering surge forces, we brought them home, but there are 68,000 Americans are still fighting alongside their coalition and Afghan partners. We are also bringing mountains of equipment home from theater -- a huge logistical challenge. The unsung heroes of this chapter in the war are the planners, the logisticians, the drivers, the pilots, and the support team who are carrying out such a daunting task.

With the surge complete, we’ve reached a critical moment for this Alliance and for this war. Let me mention three keys to our future success: first, strong coalition partnership with Afghan forces; second, effective response to insider attacks; and third, careful evolution of the campaign, including key leadership changes I’d like to share with you.

Strong Coalition Partnership with Afghan Forces

First, strong coalition partnership with Afghan forces. We’ve invested a great deal in helping to develop Afghan security forces. Now we must do everything we can to help them successfully transition and take the lead for security throughout all of Afghanistan as planned next year.

The Security Force Assistance Team model is a game-changing approach to fielding an effective fighting force, according to commanders on the ground. We must build the capabilities of Afghan Army and police, and ensure they have the embedded trainers and mentors needed to assist them as they take security lead. I urge each of your nations to help eliminate the shortfall of 58 Security Force Assistance Teams by the November Force Generation Conference. The U.S. has filled a disproportionate number of these teams in recent years, and I ask for your help to fill the gap.

We must also review the force generation process as we work to fill requirements for trainers and advisors. The recurring six-month force generation cycle generates uncertainty in our plans and relationships. It is time to consider developing longer-term relationships between ISAF members and Afghan training institutions and field units to reduce that uncertainty and to enhance our training relationships.

Effective Response to Insider Attacks

Second, we must have an effective response to insider attacks. Insider attacks are a tragic part of every war. In this war, they are occurring with greater frequency than in the past, and they’ve attracted more media attention in recent months. Whatever motivates these attacks, the enemy intends to use them to undermine mutual trust and cohesion, driving a wedge between us and our Afghan partners. We can only deny the enemy its objective by countering these attacks with all of our strength -- and fortifying our resolve with the signs of our progress. General Allen just briefed what we are doing alongside our Afghan partners to diminish and defeat this threat, including:
-- Enhanced training, both pre-deployment and in the field, that emphasizes cultural awareness, counter-intelligence techniques, vigilance, and real-time information sharing;
-- Adaptive levels of partnering based on continuous reviews of threat information;
-- Expansion of vetting and counter-intelligence operations, by our own and by our Afghan partners;
- “Constant emphasis on effective use of “Guardian Angels” and other protective measures to deter attackers and to ensure the ability to respond quickly when an attack begins; and
-- Continuous efforts to analyze attack patterns in order to develop even stronger methods of prevention.

I believe that we can and will counter this threat with these efforts and with the full partnership of Minister of Defense Mohammedi and Minister of Interior Patang. Fellow Ministers, what tests us -- what tests this Alliance -- is not the problem of insider attacks. What tests us is how we respond to them. Still deeper partnerships, still deeper integration, those are the responses that will frustrate the enemy’s designs to capitalize on this problem.

Careful Campaign Evolution and Key Leadership Changes

Third, the evolution of the campaign and key leadership changes. A key challenge ISAF faces over the next two years is to plan and resource for the mid-2013 milestone and for the end of transition in December 2014. We must meet that challenge together. Here are the new realities we will see in the coming year:
-- We will operate from fewer bases;
-- The net flow of material will turn outbound from Afghanistan;
-- U.S. enabler support for ISAF partners will continue but the scope of support will change as transition proceeds and as we jointly reduce our forces;
-- As Afghan forces assume full responsibility, ISAF forces will continue stepping back.

While we have yet to determine the necessary size and composition of the force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014, NATO’s presence should be steadfast and effective. We must follow through on the commitments made by our political leaders at the Chicago Summit, including implementation of the Lisbon framework.

A clear signal of U.S. commitment to this Alliance and to the mission in Afghanistan is the quality of our NATO ISAF leadership team. General Allen has commanded ISAF through a crucial period, and his outstanding leadership has put the campaign on a path to success.

He oversaw the war at the height of its combat strength and he oversaw the surge recovery. Under his leadership, ISAF has put relentless pressure on the enemy and built up Afghan security forces, which are now demonstrating their readiness to take the security lead.

As he completes his tour of duty, I am pleased to announce that President Obama will nominate General Allen to succeed Admiral Jim Stavridis as Commander, U.S. European Command, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

General Allen is well known to all of you, and if confirmed his experience as COMISAF will be instrumental in his broader role and in leading NATO’s oversight of the mission in Afghanistan.

President Obama will nominate General Joseph Dunford, United States Marine Corps, to succeed General Allen as Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and Commander, ISAF. General Dunford currently serves as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, and he is an exceptionally gifted strategic leader. He is combat-tested. He believes in ISAF and if confirmed will be an extraordinary leader of it.

Lastly, let me take this opportunity to thank Admiral Stavridis for his service. I have trusted his wise counsel and I’ve depended on his ability to sustain our military and political relationships in Brussels and across this region. Jim will be here until the spring, so we’ll have much more to say about his leadership and service in the coming months.

I thank my fellow ministers for your continued support and consultations with these great leaders, and I am confident that this new NATO ISAF leadership team will carry forward the momentum we’ve achieved together.

All of us need to leave this meeting with the same talking points that reflect reality and unity:
1. We are succeeding in implementing the campaign plan agreed to in Chicago;
2. Whatever tactics the enemy throws at us -- IEDs, insider attacks, car bombs -- we will not allow those tactics to divide us from our Afghan partners or divert us from our mission.
3. "In Together -- Out Together”: ISAF will complete our mission to help Afghanistan secure and govern itself.

We, the defense leaders of this historic Alliance, preserve a legacy of mutual determination and sacrifice in the face of danger and difficulty. By uniting our powers to finish the long fight in Afghanistan, we will honor that legacy and pass it intact to future generations in the North Atlantic area and beyond.

We’ve come too far, we’ve fought too many battles, we’ve spilled too much blood, not to finish the job.”

By: Brant

Current ISAF Placemat

As of 10 September 2012

By: Brant

Surge in Afghanistan? Not Anymore!

As per the DoD, the surge is over. Secretary Panetta states:

“This week, the ongoing effort in Afghanistan marked an important milestone: the United States military has completed drawing down the surge forces President Obama committed in December of 2009, reducing our presence by 33,000 troops on schedule. As we reflect on this moment, it is an opportunity to recognize that the surge accomplished its objectives of reversing Taliban momentum on the battlefield, and dramatically increased the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This growth has allowed us and our ISAF Coalition partners to begin the process of transition to Afghan security lead, which will soon extend across every province and more than 75 percent of the Afghan population. At the same time, we have struck enormous blows against al Qaeda's leadership, consistent with our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda and denying it a safe-haven.

“It is important to underscore that even as our surge troops return home, there are roughly 68,000 Americans who remain in a tough fight in Afghanistan, alongside their NATO and Afghan partners. We are a nation at war. But the international community is also strongly united behind our shared strategy to transition to Afghan security control, which will be completed by the end of 2014.”

Many of the troops are working their way out of Afghanistan.

Just days ago, Pentagon figures showed there were 70,000 American troops in Afghanistan. On Wednesday, Australian Brig. Gen. Roger Noble, the deputy operations chief for NATO in Afghanistan, refused to pinpoint for Pentagon reporters when exactly the "surge recovery" would be completed. Noble said "not many more" surge troops remained to leave Afghanistan and that the goal of reaching 68,000 by Oct. 1 was "very, very close." He added that the timing was "very dependent on strategic lift, weather - and they change daily by sort of hundreds, if you know what I mean. " Noble was referring to the last remaining troops that were still awaiting their flights out of Afghanistan, U.S. officials said. There has also been a significant reduction in military equipment that matches the reduction in troops. Lt. Gen. John Terry, the commander of ISAF Joint Command, told Pentagon reporters that half of the 60,000 pieces of rolling stock and another 30,000 containers had already been shipped out of Afghanistan. Many of the surge troops were sent to southern Afghanistan to fight the Taliban in its strongholds. As troops pushed into areas long controlled by the Taliban, the number of U.S. and NATO casualties began to rise.

By: Brant

Palantir and the Acquisitions System

Did 3MECH try to sneak their way around the system?

The issue that alarmed Shyu was that the unit said it couldn’t pay for the system, and the company offered its technology on a cost-free basis, as opposed to normal contracting methods. Shyu wrote that “these circumstances warrant immediate corrective action by the Army to ensure that we comply with fundamental rules relating to how the government obtains goods and services from industry.”
The memos, addressed to the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office and the Technical Support Working Group; and to intelligence contractor Praescient Analytics and Palantir, asked for a “temporary training/reach-back server” from Palantir before the 3rd ID’s deployment to Afghanistan to assume command of Regional Command-South. The unit deployed in August.
The 3rd ID’s memo said that the unit’s budget “will not support the purchase of Palantir. Operational Needs Statement (ONS) was considered, but standard length of timeline for ONS cannot be tolerated. This requirement needs to be filled immediately.” The memos obtained by Defense News show that the 3rd ID considered the 82nd Airborne’s use of Palantir in Afghanistan in 2012 critical in helping to fill “major capability gaps” in the division’s existing intelligence software, and that Palantir is “the only platform capable of filling their advanced analytic requirements.” Because the unit planned on using the software on its upcoming deployment, the memo states that “3rd ID needs a rapid fielding of this system to quickly fill critical capability/training gap prior to our pending deployment.”

One has to wonder whether or not all this bullshit would have happened if CIDNE hadn't fucked CENTCOM, and the Army as a whole, with all their political machinations surrounding the shutdown of FusionNET. There's nothing that we've heard that Palantir can do that FusionNET couldn't do 7 years ago, and it was already in the Army inventory, bought and paid for by the government.
CIDNE ramped up their political whining machine instead of improving their software, and got FusionNET shut down. As far as CIDNE was concerned, their problem was solved.
But the ground forces' problems were not, and thus Palantir was born to try to help unfuck the gaps in capability that CIDNE continued to have. The difference this time is that Palantir has better political cover than FusionNET did.
However, we're now paying for another system to do what CIDNE claimed they could do all along, when we'd already paid for one back in '04-'07. The US taxpayer is sucking up the cost of CIDNE's political dick-dancing by being forced to pay for the same capabilities all over again.

By: Brant

Suspension of Joint NATO-Afghan Ops Only Temporary... for now

NATO announced that the suspension of joint NATO-Afghan operations could be "temporary".

A cutback on NATO military operations alongside Afghan forces in response to a surge of insider attacks that have left more than 50 foreign troops dead is a "temporary" response to current threats, a coalition spokesman said on Tuesday.
"To be honest, we see this as a temporary and prudent response to current threat levels from the U.S. film and insider attacks," said Colonel Tom Collins, a senior spokesman for NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.

By: Brant

Is the Plan to Split Afghanistan Legit?

There's a controversial plan to split up Afghanistan being floated in England. How serious is it?

"Isaf may be confident that its revised security strategy is finally working, but the insurgent threat will not be removed by force alone," he said in the report, seen by The Independent on Sunday. "The Taliban will not enter into a meaningful dialogue if there is no feasible political strategy within which they can participate... An alternative solution [offers] a less centralised political structure that better reflects the ethnic make-up of the country, the already established economic hubs and the regional interest of the Taliban, who might then be encouraged towards a political settlement."

The plan divides Afghanistan into eight zones, based around the "economic hubs" of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Khost and Bamyan. The areas would be administered by a council representing different ethnic groups and overseen by one or more foreign countries. Mr Ellwood also claims that creating a post of prime minister, with many of the "disproportionate" powers currently held by the President, would help allay concerns over the man who has been in charge of the country for almost eight years.

But Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, said: "Splitting the country into such regions will result in the empowerment of what we have started calling 'local (or regional) power brokers' and what was known as 'warlords' before, whose misrule between 1992 and 1996 caused the rise of the Taliban in the first place."

By: Brant

DoD Statement on the Haqqani Network

The DoD has released a statement on the Haqqani Network.

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs George Little provided the following statement:

“We welcome Secretary Clinton's announcement that the Haqqani Network meets the statutory criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224.

The Haqqani Network represents a significant threat to U.S. national security and we will continue our aggressive military action against this threat. These new group designations will build on our efforts to degrade the Network's capacity to carry out attacks, including affecting fundraising abilities, targeting them with our military and intelligence resources, and pressing Pakistan to take action. We will continue these efforts, reinforced by today's new designations. By strengthening our whole-of-government approach against the Haqqanis, we are supporting our campaign efforts in Afghanistan and further limiting the organization's capacity to destabilize the region.”

By: Brant

Interview With Designers of A Distant Plain

Hey folks! GrogHeads.com has a fantastic interview with Brian Train and Volko Ruhnke, designers of A Distant Plain, GMT's upcoming boardgame on Afghanistan using Volko's COIN system.

And as a bonus - the designers have agreed to stick around a few days and answer some of your questions in the forums

Please stop by and check it out :)

Part 1 of the interview

Part 2 of the interview

By: Brant

DoD IDs Next Afghan Units

The DoD has released the next units for upcoming Afghanistan rotation

The Department of Defense today identified three major units to deploy as part of the upcoming rotation of forces operating in Afghanistan. The scheduled rotation involves three brigade combat teams (BCT) -- one Infantry brigade combat team with roughly 2,800 personnel; one armored brigade combat team with roughly 4,000 personnel and one infantry brigade combat team with roughly 2,870 personnel -- to rotate in winter 2012. The deploying units include:

Brigade Combat Teams:

1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.

1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas.

2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.

By: Brant

Are Iraq and Afghanistan That Different?

Clearly they are significantly different when when it is notable that a commander with Iraq experience is taking his first spin through Afghanistan.

So without commenting on Dunford’s military competence, we can still ask one quite obvious question:

Why is General Dunford being nominated as the COMISAF when, as the story concedes (in paragraph seven), “Gen. Dunford has served in Iraq but has never served a tour of duty in Afghanistan.”

Really? Ten years in Afghanistan, and almost three years after the President’s West Point speech, and we can’t find a commander who has served in Afghanistan before? Is the cupboard really that empty? As one who made the Iraq to Afghanistan transition, I can assure you that it’s neither simple, nor easy. Afghanistan is exponentially more complex—and harder.

By: Brant

GEN Dempsey's Plane Hit in Afghanistan

An attack in Afghanistan hit the CJSC's C-17 on the tarmac.

The plane of the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, was damaged after Taliban militants fired rockets at Bagram Air Field.
A military official told ABC News the attack occurred just after midnight local time at Bagram Air Field outside Kabul when Dempsey's C-17 plane was hit by fragments of indirect fire from two rockets. Dempsey was safely back in his room when the attack occurred and was not hurt in the blast. Two maintenance people working nearby sustained minor injuries.
Due to the exterior damage of the aircraft, Dempsey and his team left Bragman on a different C-17 plane. The attack also caused slight damage to an Apache helicopter that was parked nearby.

By: Brant

Some People Are Going To Have To Face Reality

and accept that their lives are not going to be spent sitting at the grown-up table.

It's not a heart-warming story of successful counterinsurgency, it's the cold, hard reality that no matter how much hand-holding we do, the the Afghan army, government, and people are not ready for the responsibility of behaving with a level of competence that the US would accept as barely adequate.

As the Taliban ramped up its attacks in eastern Afghanistan’s Wardak province this spring, the Afghan soldiers here came to a painful conclusion: They were not ready to take on the fight alone. But it was too late — the Americans were not coming back.

The transition of Combat Outpost Conlon to Afghan control — marked by a flag-raising ceremony and a visit from top U.S. military brass — was an early milestone in the NATO drawdown that will continue through 2014.

But Afghan officials worry that the problems plaguing Conlon could be replicated across the country as the U.S. military hands over authority, leaving 200,000 Afghan soldiers without the equipment or wherewithal to defeat a resilient enemy.

“The Americans left too early, and they left without giving us what we need,” said Lt. Col. Hamidullah Kohdamany, the battalion commander.

U.S. officials say that after years of depending on Americans for tactical and logistical support, Afghan soldiers often struggle to adapt to a sudden surge in responsibility.

“They’ve just never had to rely on their own leaders. They’ve always had the Americans for a backstop,” said Lt. Col. Clint Cox, the head of the U.S. military advisory team that oversees Afghan units in Wardak province. “It’s going to take some time. It’s just like with children — sometimes it takes a hard lesson for them to learn.”

It's not that it's a hard lesson to learn. It seems to be a lesson they are incapable of learning. Their initial allegiances are not to the nation, or even their fellow soldiers. Their logistical tail breaks down because the convoy guys make a delivery to the tribal elders before they ever get to the combat outpost. They've got no electricity because the funds for providing them keep lining the pockets of kleptocrats in Kabul. The vehicles don't work because the spare parts are for sale in bazaars in Kandahar.

We have to quit applying US standards of competence to a nation that seems willfully proud of their inability to even attempt to learn them.

By: Brant