The Latest in the DoD Unified Command Plans

With the disestablishment of JFCOM, the DoD has released the latest change to the Unified Command Plan 2011.

The Department of Defense has issued a change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), a strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) for commanders of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan 2011 Change 1, signed by President Obama on Sept. 12 captures administrative changes required to reflect the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command and several secretary of defense-directed efficiencies initiatives.

Every two years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the secretary of defense, any changes that may be necessary.

As in past years, this review process included the combatant commanders, service chiefs, and DoD leadership.

Significant changes made by UCP 2011 Change 1 include:

- Removing language that refers to U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), which was disestablished on Aug. 31, 2011.

- Removing language for geographic combatant command standing joint force headquarters, which are approved for disestablishment by the end of fiscal 2012.

- Adding responsibility for global standing joint force headquarters to U.S. Transportation Command. These assets will transfer as the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from USJFCOM.

- Transferring the Joint Warfare Analysis Center missions to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Joint Warfare Analysis Center was previously a subordinate command to USJFCOM.

- Removing language and responsibilities for information operations, military deception, and operations security from USSTRATCOM. These missions will transfer to the Joint Staff.

The UCP 2011 continues to support U.S. defense security commitments around the world while improving military responsiveness to emerging crises.

Click to enlarge.  Also available as a PDF from http://www.defense.gov/ucc

As noted on the page with the map, there have been a few boundary shifts:

Significant changes made by UCP 2011 include:

• Shifting AOR boundaries in the Arctic region to leverage long-standing relationships and improve unity of effort.
  
• Giving U.S. Northern Command responsibility to advocate for Arctic capabilities.
  
• Codifying the President's approval to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command.
  
• Expanding U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations.
  
• Giving U.S. Transportation Command responsibility for synchronizing planning of global distribution operations.

The UCP 2011 continues to support U.S. defense security commitments around the world while improving military responsiveness to emerging crises.

By: Brant

The Breakup of JFCOM

The DoD has announced what JFCOM functions are being housed elsewhere.

As part of the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Department of Defense today announced the approved reassignment of critical USJFCOM organizations and functions to designated combatant commands, military services and the Joint Staff.

These organizational reporting reassignments ensure the most critical functions and expertise are maintained for the joint warfighter. This reassignment plan was developed in coordination with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the Services. This organizational transfer of authority for critical functions includes such reassignments as the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command to U.S. Transportation Command, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center to U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency to the Air Force, and the NATO School to U.S. European Command.

“Our goal is to transfer streamlined, relevant joint functions to appropriate Department of Defense entities,” said Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. “We will ensure we sustain the momentum and gains in jointness while maintaining critical interaction with NATO and other multi-national partners.”

When the transition is complete, nearly 50 percent of USJFCOM personnel and budget will remain in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia along with core missions, such as joint training, joint force provider, joint concept and doctrine development, and joint integration. These functions will be aligned under the Joint Staff for leadership and direction.

The formal transfer of these organizations and functions to designated commands will be completed by late summer. Under the current timeline, USJFCOM will be disestablished as a four-star combatant command by the end of August 2011. The physical moves of all USJFCOM activities will be completed by March 2012.

By: Brant

DoD's New Unified Command Plan

DoD's Unified Command Plan catches up with reality...

The Department of Defense released today the updated the Unified Command Plan (UCP), a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. Unified Command Plan 2011, signed by the President on April 6, assigns several new missions to the combatant commanders.

Every two years, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary. As in past years, the 2011 review process included the combatant commanders, service chiefs and DoD leadership.

A revised map of the combatant commanders' areas of responsibilities can be found at http://go.usa.gov/Tp7 . Significant changes made by UCP 2011 include:

- Shifting areas of responsibilities boundaries in the Arctic region to leverage long-standing relationships and improve unity of effort. As a result of this realignment, responsibility for the Arctic region is now shared between USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM rather than USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM and USPACOM as directed in previous UCPs.

- Giving USNORTHCOM responsibility to advocate for Arctic capabilities.

- Codifying the President's approval to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command.

- Expanding U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations.

- Giving U.S. Transportation Command responsibility for synchronizing planning of global distribution operations.

UCP 2011 continues to support U.S. defense security commitments around the world while improving military responsiveness to emerging crises.

Nice to see the DoD finally put pen to paper on a decision made over a year ago (the disbanding of JFCOM)...

By: Brant

US Politician Throwing a Hissy-Fit

Look Senator, I get it: you want to protect jobs in your state. Check. But if the jobs you're seeking to protect (a) should've never existed to start with, and (b) are actually counterproductive to the war effort, why are you fighting so hard to hold onto them? More to the point, why are you hamstringing the careers to two fine generals just to make a public point about your blatant rent-seeking homerism?

Sen. Jim Webb (D) has alerted the Department of Defense that he will put a hold on all civilian and flag officer nominations until he gets more information about the decision-making process to Secretary Robert Gates' recommendation that the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk be shuttered.

The move elevates Webb's demand for information from the Obama administration and comes just a week before the midterm elections. The decision by the Obama administration's defense secretary to close JFCOM as a cost-saving measure has been a major campaign issue in a race between Democrat Rep. Glenn Nye and Republican Scott Rigell.

Members of Virginia's congressional delegation of both parties have said they were blindsided when Gates announced the recommendation, part of a plan to trim the Pentagon's budget in coming years. They have subpoened the Defense Department, insisting that the Pentagon has been stonewalling their request for more information about how the decision was reached.

"This failure to respond to a request for basic information that should be readily available is indicative of the lack of cooperation that has characterized the proposal to close the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)," said a statement from Webb, a former Secretary of the Navy. "Such data is highly relevant to our ability to reach our own conclusions in the fulfillment of our constitutional responsibility to assess a proposal that has significant ramifications not only in Virginia but throughout the country and also overseas."

By: Brant

GrogNews Morning Headlines

Another day, another massacre in Mexico. This is at least 4 in the past 7 days.

Remember that "rogue hit squad" disguised as an OSINT program? Well, now the ringleader is under investigation for misleading military leadership about the purpose of the program.

Tense moments on the Korean border as as the two nations exchange shots. Ah, but who shot first?

The US and the Russians have teamed up for a joint drug raid in Afghanistan.

GEN Odierno is taking command of JFCOM. Will he be the last commander there?

By: Brant

Virginia Politicians Still Whining About JFCOM

So Virginia Gov Bob McDonnell is still complaining about the closure of JFCOM, but at least this time it's in economic terms, instead of trying to sound like it's a military necessity.

Virginia leaders pressed the Pentagon on Tuesday for a fuller explanation of the planned closing of the U.S. Joint Forces Command but said they received little more than a promised future meeting with Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Gov. Bob McDonnell and members of the state's congressional delegation met privately in Washington, D.C., with two high-level Pentagon officials in an attempt to pry out more on what went into the military's decision, announced Aug. 9 by Gates.

"The information that came forth was not particularly compelling, not particularly more illuminating," McDonnell said in a teleconference.

The Republican governor was assured that he would get an opportunity to meet with Gates, whom McDonnell said has not taken his calls since the announcement, but he was unable to secure public meetings in northern Virginia and Norfolk on proposed defense cuts.

The Joint Forces Command, or JFCOM, occupies more than 1 million square feet of real estate in Norfolk and Suffolk, an area with a huge military presence, including the world's largest naval base. As its name suggests, the command trains troops from all services to work together for specific missions.

The 11-year-old command employs nearly 6,000, many of them civilian contractors.

Gates' announcement was the first step toward identifying $100 billion in savings over the next five years. The cuts also include deep reductions in military contracts, which fuels a big part of northern Virginia's economy as well.

McDonnell estimated that the JFCOM closing would cost Virginia 10,000 jobs, directly and indirectly, and said other defense cuts would be painful.

You would think McDonnell would be all about keeping spending under control, right?

After all, he told Sean Hannity that it's all about living within your means.

And we did it by cutting spending, reducing our budget estimates to a realistic amount, and making sure that we're doing what American families and businesses do, and that is don't spend more than you take in. It's a pretty simple formula.

And he told an anti-tax group that he's been an advocate of reducing the size of the government for years.

"The thousands of AFP members in Virginia follow state government and public policy closely,'' McDonnell spokeswoman Stacey Johnson said. "They know that Governor Bob McDonnell has been a champion of reducing spending and making government smaller and more efficient.

His own own campaign materials make it sound like he's all about cutting waste.

Bob McDonnell is a friend of the taxpayer, as McDonnell cut taxes while in the House of Delegates, supports eliminating the "death tax", and is a foe of wasteful spending. Something that is very appealing during this time of economic insanity in Washington.

I mean what could be seen as more wasteful than a "military" headquarters that's 2/3 contractors? Especially in a day and age in which the contractors are (a) unpopular - thanks, Xewater! - and (b) expensive?

By: Brant

Eliminate JFCOM? DBB Thinks So

According to TheHill.com, the Defense Business Board is recommending that Secretary Gates eliminate Joint Forces Command as a way to save some money.

A Pentagon advisory board is expected to recommend that Defense Secretary Robert Gates eliminate the Joint Forces Command as part of a drive to cut Pentagon bloat.

The Defense Business Board (DBB), the Pentagon’s independent board of economic and business advisers, has been tasked by Gates to recommend options for reducing the Pentagon’s overhead, or indirect operating expenses. The board is also expected to offer recommendations on making the Pentagon’s business operations more efficient.

Gates has launched a sweeping initiative to find about $100 billion in savings over the next five years by reducing unnecessary spending at the Pentagon. The goal is to pour that savings into the fighting force and the modernization of weapons systems.

The Pentagon is expected to pay $200 billion in overhead costs this year — an amount higher than the entire gross domestic product of Israel or the United Arab Emirates, according to the DBB.

The board in October will submit its final and formal short- and longer-term recommendations, which are likely to include the elimination of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), one of the Department of Defense’s 10 combatant commands, which is headquartered in Norfolk, Va.

DBB has found JFCOM has more contractors on its payroll than military and civilian personnel.

Eliminating JFCOM could save billions of dollars. Overall, the 10 combat commands, which include Central Command, European Command and Africa Command, have a total of 98,000 military, civilian and contractor personnel with yearly expenses of $16.5 billion — more than the entire State Department or NASA budgets.

By: Brant

Mattis Tapped to Take CENTCOM

USMC GEN Mattis has been nominated to take over Central Command.

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, an erudite combat veteran known for quoting poetry and openly expressing his enthusiasm for "killing the enemy," has been picked to take over U.S. Central Command, the Pentagon announced Thursday.

Mattis would replace Gen. David Petraeus, who is in Afghanistan as the U.S. and NATO's top military officer there. Petraeus took over after Gen. Stanley McChrystal was removed by President Obama on June 23 in the wake of a Rolling Stone article that quoted McChrystal and his staff mocking U.S. civilian leaders.

Mattis is currently the head of Norfolk, Va.-based Joint Forces Command, which coordinates strategy and trains young generals. In June, he was passed over for the job of commandant of the Marine Corps in favor of Gen. James Amos.

As head of Central Command, Mattis would oversee U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as across the Middle East, including Iraq and Iran. In his new position, Mattis technically would be Petraeus' boss.

By: Brant

JFCOM Wants - Get This - JOINT(!) Data Sharing

And they're serious enough to hold a conference about it!

Lt. Gen. Michael Oates, head of the Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, began the symposium with a complaint about the failure to analyze and share intelligence in a timely manner with allies in Afghanistan. “We disable ourselves by an inability to share information,” he said. “We’ve got to [find] a way ahead immediately to improve information fusion” and to develop databases for tactical commanders. “There is no shortage of data,” he added, “but there is a dearth of analysis . . . and it has to be provided to our coalition partners freely so they can enable their formations.” Crucial to this effort is the creation of “mobile databases [that] provide real-time effective information for tactical commanders.”

Seriously though, FusionNet was doing this 6 years ago, with links to CENTRIXS and publication to the PASS. CIDNE still won't open their data, because, well, they're CIDNE.

Good thing Wortmann pulled the plug on FusionNet in favor of CIDNE, eh? After all, we wouldn't want to shitcan a system THAT DOES EXACTLY WHAT WE SAY WE NEED, 5 YEARS LATER, right?

By: Brant

Q&A with Gen. James Mattis

Defense News has an excellent Q&A with Gen. James Mattis. Here's the first few questions...

Q. What are the real lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?

A. War is a human endeavor, a social problem, and we have modest expectations that technology is going to solve a problem as complex as warfare.

Second, no war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote, as we're often saying in the military.

A third point is that what we cannot do is look towards war today as something that we are going to fight on our own. We are going to be fighting alongside allies of some stripe, and we are going to have to create a military that can easily adapt to other allies fighting alongside it as part of our formations, and perhaps us fighting as part of their formations.

But you can't simply transport the lessons from one theater, even one as recent as Iraq, directly to Afghanistan. It's its own country, the enemy is its own enemy, the terrain is different. Most importantly, the human terrain - the complexity of the human connections, the tribal relationships - is different.

Q. You're changing JFCom's name?

A. I've asked for that change: to Joint and Coalition Forces Command. That decision is not yet made.

Q. You and Petraeus changed how the Iraq war was fought. What did that teach you about change?

A. Gen. Petraeus and I came back from Iraq about the same time, he to Fort Leavenworth for the Army, me to Quantico for the Marines. We worked on this with our staffs, then he went back and changed the face of the war in Iraq. I did not go back as operational commander; I defer that success to him and the troops that were over there. I had at best an indirect, perhaps intellectual or training impact.

The real lessons you learn when you try to change an organization as big as ours is that the first thing you must do is define the problem. If you don't define the problem in very stark terms, then you're going to probably solve the wrong problem. We have too often in the 1990s, and perhaps into the first part of this decade, tried to solve the problem by calling things transforma tional or game-changers. We had not, I think, defined the problem well enough.

What Dave Petraeus and I had as an advantage was we were in the middle of a very clearly defined war in terms of the fact that the old ways weren't going to work. We looked for what was working, accumulated it into the doctrine and passed it out, largely written by NCOs and officers fresh from their searing experiences in Iraq.

By: Brant

Next JFCOM Commander: GEN Odierno

The President has nominated GEN Ray Odierno to be the new CG at JFCOM.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced today that President Barack Obama has nominated U. S. Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

Located in Norfolk, Va., USJFCOM oversees a force of more than 1.16 million dedicated men and women, spanning USJFCOM's service component commands and subordinate activities. The command includes active and reserve personnel from each branch of the armed forces and civilian and contract employees.

Pending confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Odierno will oversee UFJFCOM's roles in joint concept development and experimentation, joint capability development, joint training, and force provision and management as outlined in the Department of Defense's Unified Command Plan.

If confirmed, Odierno will replace Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis later this year; currently, Odierno commands U.S. Forces - Iraq, a post he has held since September 2008.

By: Brant

Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC

Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC
click to enlarge flyer ->

First things first - I got here late. Why? Because the event was moved, to a location with -zero- parking, which meant humping it across campus, through a construction zone that detours pedestrians while disorienting them, and to a building whose "main entrance" faces the back wall of another building instead of facing the street. I missed the first 15 minutes; I'm hot & sweaty; and I've got no live web connections (or even a power jack), so this is all getting uploaded at once instead of as I go. No, I'm not happy.

Apparently I didn't miss any speakers, just the intro remarks

Professor James Gow - King's College, London

talking about the changes in conflicts over the world in the last 30-60 years, and speaking very much from a script instead of talking as he goes.

Contested legitimacy among the combatants - who is the "correct" or "moral" combatant, whether based on ethnicity, religion, politics, etc

Contemporary armed conflict is complex in that it is a "war among the people" - either hiding among the friendly or sowing fear in the unfriendly
Civilians are widely targeted and a full partner in the conflict rather than just 'in the way'

Technological changes have greatly increased precision and therefore lowered the tolerance for imprecise strikes
'De-humanization' of war, in which "western" personnel are half a world a way and not vulnerable to counterattacks at all; technological buffer that cognitively separates the warrior from the war

(shuffling of papers as he lost part of the script - not a "talk" but a "speech" with very closely narrated guidelines)

Force - Will - Passion
19th century was focused on force; 21st century is focused on will and the battle for the hearts & minds of the personnel

Switches to PPT with the juxtaposition of Normandy vs a child soldier in Africa

"Victory" has been replaced by "success"

Is now talking about a "Trinity 3(+)" but going through slides too fast to get a look at it

• (Multiple) Global audiences - political leaders - armed forces - people
  
• Partners & Allies
  
• Opponents
  
• Bystanders
  
• Transnational communities

Professor Hew Strachan, Oxford College - (oldest chair of military history in the world)

No PPT, just much shouting, as though the broadcast mike on the podium was broken, and we were trying to talk back to the original site of the talk back at Hyde Hall.
Talking about the follow-up to a Reagan speech in the '80s that announced the SDI
After the talk, Strom asked whether the nuclear deterrent was the correct paradigm, and asked the audience to imagine a possibility of the world without a Cold War
The MoD reps scoffed and encouraged the moderator to move on and discuss things that were actually realistic

Pre-1990: focus on stability
Since 1990: focused on the novelty and the new - what can it do for us, what's cool, what's cutting edge, and what's the latest and greatest.
Capable of producing strategic forecasts and long-term predictions, but very poor strategy
Our analyses are rather poor, and we call them "strategy" to sound like we know what we're talking about, but we openly acknowledge that we have no idea what we're talking about.

Four areas of continuity
1. US / NATO / Allies need to maintain status quo path; quite a challenge for NATO, and esp US. Hard for US to see itself as a liberalizing/democratizing influence while simultaneously maintaining hegemonic power (conservative viewpoint)
How do you manage change, given that you know it will occur?

2. The drivers of war - failed states, rogue states, non-state actors - all work from the basic reference of "the state" and build off of the state institutions as their primary building block.
state-based solutions are the norm, and conflicts like water, or ethnicities, occur along borders where there is artificial constraint

3. Despite this, conventional war between states has been consistent in frequency since 1945.
Civil wars receding after initial post-colonial flare-ups, as good governance has proliferated
Inter-state war is still common, but b/c it's not of the level of WWI / WWII / Cold War, we don't treat it as "major" war (Falklands, Gulf I)

4. Contemporary war is "change-back"
By emphasizing 'novelty' - non-state actors, states w/o internal monopolies on force, commercial-focused warlords - we miss that these are not novel and lack the ability to cognitively analyze them in the right frame.
Two distinctions
- "Nature" and "Character" of War: The essence of war is its reciprocity; once you take out force, everything changes ; character of each war is different even though the nature is consistent.
Character of war changes not just from war-to-war, but within the war as it goes on (example of Gulf II from 'liberation' to COIN)
- Strategy in Theory & Strategy in Practice of War:
Strategy in Theory pre-Clausewitz discussed only contemporary; post-Clausewitz was more historical and looked backwards for parallels to current action; during Cold War strategic theory became atrophied b/c of lack of direct experience with nukes - current strategy theory is bad
Strategy in Practice is very focused on tools and not outcomes (technology over population); but war is not significantly different over the years (principles of war) - discussion of French general whose quote highlights this


During the 1990s, the western powers waged war at a distance for utilitarian purposes (ie Kosovo)
Post-9/11, pre-emptive war was accepted ahead of pre-emption
Now, war is seen as discretionary and a choice, rather than necessary

But there cannot be a coherent strategy without a coherent viewpoint of how war is viewed
Totally different focus on the war if it is one of survival than one of choice (my note: explains our huge gulf in appreciation of how Israel views war)

Don't understand difference between policy and strategy
Policy can become subordinated to war if we're not careful
Policy and strategy should be contentious and they cannot be subordinated to each other permanently, but always in conflict

When political leadership is divided or is not engaged, then military leadership expands to fill the vacuum. Current strategy in the US is seen coming from Petraeus and McChrystal rather than the political leaders
US strategy should be discussed at NSC level, and other countries interested in mimicking that structure, but NSC is not seen as a strategic leader in the US


GEN Mattis, USMC, Commander JFCOM:

Nature of war will change when the nature of water changes.

Have to separate politics from uniforms, esp among the officer corps or the trust btw civ-mil breaks down.

Need a strategic re-awakening of officer corps so that strategy & policy are coupled and clarified. Officer corps ceded strategy to po,iticians in 1950s with rise of nukes.
Hannibal was very tactically proficient but had no strategy.


My battery is running low - no power outlets, either! - what a crap way to run a conference... ass-clowns... I'll have to sign off at some point here. I hope to get a seat with a power outlet tomorrow (back in the original building) for the early sessions...

Links for all conference articles:
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC, Day 2 morning sessions
GrogNews: Liveblog of War and Military Operations in the 21st Century: Civil-Military Operations conference at UNC, Day 2 morning session 2


By: Brant